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The ongoing ‘fourth industrial revolution’ is driven 
by the megatrends of globalisation and technological 
change, which lie at the basis of other dynamics 
(i.e. global value chains, automation, digitalisation, 
servicification, innovation). Industry, and with it 
traditional production and growth models, is being 
structurally reshaped. Commitments to enhance 
sustainability and security compound to these  
changes. The gains of the transformation, however,  
will likely be concentrated and thus increase  
regional inequalities. 
The current debate on EU industrial  
policy overlooks the inequality risk and 
focuses on international competition, 
sectors and technologies at the frontier  
of innovation instead. 
The current debate on EU industrial policy overlooks  
the inequality risk and focuses on international 
competition, sectors and technologies at the  
frontier of innovation instead. In order to be truly  
EU-wide, however, the future EU industrial strategy  
must include measures that actively target all EU 
regions and ensure that they are brought along  
the transformation.
BACKGROUND: GROWING INEQUALITIES AND 
REINFORCING DYNAMICS
The pending industrial transformation has the  
potential to create prosperity sustainably and 
efficiently, allowing the EU improve its welfare and 
competitiveness. However, it may also increase 
socioeconomic and territorial disparities in the EU.  
First, various characteristics determine whether and  
how much a region can benefit from the changes. 
Second, the abovementioned megatrends can further 
exacerbate unequal dynamics.
Some more fit than others
 
EU regions differ greatly in terms of their industrial and 
governance structure, skill base, innovation capacity 
and performance, workforce structure and productivity, 
openness to trade, infrastructure, institutional capacity, 
energy mix and income. These factors interact with each 
other unevenly. For example, low-income regions export 
mostly low tech-intensive goods.1 They will thus be at a 
growing disadvantage as they rely on imports of critical, 
high-tech products and will increasingly suffer from 
competition from lower-cost countries.
Similarly, it is estimated that low-income workers 
are more exposed to the risks of automation, with a 
geographic concentration that harms relatively poorer 
countries (e.g. Slovenia, Slovakia).2 Demand for skills 
increases across the board in knowledge economies 
and regions with a relatively low skill base will face 
difficulties in attracting and retaining talent. This will 
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inevitably have consequences on productivity and 
innovation capacity. Reversely, some areas are better 
placed than others to keep up with the industrial 
transition, and will likely reap most of the advantages. 
Some areas are better placed than others 
to keep up with the industrial transition, 
and will likely reap most of the advantages. 
 
Concentrated activity in well-off areas
 
Economic activity tends to concentrate in economically 
advanced areas to benefit from their larger markets, 
networks of workers, and technology and knowledge 
transfers (i.e. agglomeration economies). In the 
EU, this tends to be located in dynamic ‘core’ urban 
areas. Innovation, knowledge and economic 
agglomeration are self-perpetuating: the more these 
are concentrated, the more they benefit from spatial 
spillovers and generate growth, which in turn increases 
economic agglomeration and thus innovation.3 
Agglomeration leads to higher productivity, growth 
and returns on investment. Importantly, however, 
these effects tend to be spatially bound and do not 
disseminate beyond advanced, relatively well-off areas.4 
Additionally, winner-takes-all dynamics lead to the 
formation of ‘superstar firms’, especially in the digital 
economy. These top players can keep up with innovative 
and technological change and attract the best human 
capital5 and are often located in agglomerated areas, 
thus reinforcing inequalities.
In theory, the costs of agglomeration (i.e. pollution, 
high prices, congestion) should counterbalance the 
advantages and push some activities towards other, 
relatively cheaper, areas. However, the EU’s metropoles 
are defying this logic by remaining the centres of 
growth. One reason is that economic activities are 
highly reliant on skills, networks and technologies, 
which tend to be scarce outside of agglomerations.6 
There are thus few incentives for relocating and cities, 
even expensive ones, continue to capture the benefits. 
Secondly, compared to the past, activities that rely on 
cheap land and labour can now outsource to developing 
countries, leapfrogging the comparatively more 
expensive, less-developed EU regions. The dispersion of 
activities away from ‘core’ cities, as predicted by theory 
and sometimes confirmed in the past, is not happening 
as expected today.7
The transition to ‘industry 4.0’ will likely accelerate 
territorial inequalities by increasing the relevance 
of activities that benefit already advanced regions 
disproportionally. The following section explores the 
policy debate on the future EU-wide industrial strategy 
concerning these issues.
STATE OF PLAY: A SKEWED POLICY DEBATE 
The need for an EU-wide industrial strategy is increasingly 
being recognised as a necessary tool to ensure that EU 
industry can maintain its competitiveness vis-à-vis 
global competitors in a time of deep technological and 
environmental change.8 Inequality however, does not 
appear to be taken into consideration.
Missing the point
 
Recently, momentum for a fully-fledged EU industrial 
strategy has materialised. In February 2019 France 
and Germany moved together to call for “a genuine 
European industrial policy”, focusing on innovation, new 
technologies, competitiveness, and trade and competition 
policy.9 The European Council of March 2019 invited 
the European Commission to present “a long-term 
vision for the EU’s industrial future”, mentioning policy 
areas such as the digital economy, innovation, global 
competition, trade and key technologies.10 The Council 
conclusions on an EU industrial policy strategy identify 
digitalisation, sustainability, technological change and 
security as the trends affecting industry.11 However, these 
contributions do not ask for more scrutiny of the needs 
of all EU regions and fail to acknowledge that industrial 
transformation and its related policies can result in 
higher territorial inequality. The European Council’s 
Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024 marginally admits the 
existence of territorial divides, but does not mention the 
risk of their perpetuation nor the need to address them 
with the industrial strategy.12 More recently, Commission 
President-elect Ursula von der Leyen’s priorities include 
ensuring a just transition for all, through tailored support 
and a ‘Just Transition Fund’.13 While this objective is 
welcomed, it must be noticed that it is referred to in 
the context of an ‘ecological transition’ only, and is not 
considered an overarching objective of her growth and 
industrial strategy.
Unintended, unpleasant consequences
 
Clearly, the EU’s industrial competitiveness and 
role as a global leader and standard-setter are 
imperative for ensuring future prosperity and should 
be supported. However, inequality is hardly taken 
into account. Without an explicit goal for even 
development and inclusive industrial transition, the 
focus on the technological frontier, international trade 
and knowledge-intensive production could create 
unintended negative consequences. The risk is that 
the main beneficiaries of policy provisions will be 
the already advanced and relatively better off, thus 
reinforcing agglomeration dynamics. 
The consequences of territorial inequality are social 
and political tensions. Recent discontent with disparities 
and (relative) decline has revealed a geographic pattern. 
Emerging research shows that higher shares of votes for 
anti-establishment parties are localised in areas where the 
benefits of recent trends – globalisation and technological 
change – are less present.14
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Without careful policy design, the measures of the 
EU industrial strategy could worsen this vicious cycle. 
Importantly, member states are responsible for their 
own development and industrial policies that may 
reinforce these trends, and the EU does not have the 
jurisdiction nor the power to compensate for these. 
Nonetheless, there is scope to mainstream territorial 
inequalities into EU policies, and the upcoming EU 
industrial strategy is an occasion to bring this forward.
PROSPECTS: AN INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 
CENTRED ON EQUALITY15
A change of mind-set
 
The EU must acknowledge that the industrial transition 
can result in further inequality, and realise that measures 
supporting excellent, cutting-edge sectors are insufficient 
in achieving a smooth transition to industry 4.0 for the 
EU economy as a whole. 
The EU must acknowledge that the 
industrial transition can result in  
further inequality.
The first step is to challenge assumptions. The 
understanding accompanying EU policies has been that 
growth reduces regional inequalities: economic growth 
would boost the diffusion of technology and investment 
from leading to less advanced, cheaper regions, thus 
serving as the main channel of regional convergence.16 
This view has been relatively unchallenged, and ‘growth’ 
has been a paramount concept in the Lisbon and 
Europe 2020 Strategies. However, it is now emerging 
that the assumption is flawed. As mentioned earlier, 
technologies and innovation hardly disseminate, and 
today’s activities require skills rather than cheap land 
and labour. It is of utmost importance that the policy 
assumptions of growth and diffusion are questioned and 
replaced by a clearer assessment of reality.  
Critical evaluation
 
The EU should assess whether its past policies 
have been successful in ensuring an evenly spread 
development across EU regions, or whether they have 
had (unintended) effects on the perpetuation and/
or exacerbation of agglomeration and polarisation. 
Importantly, positive effects about convergence at 
the national level may hide disparities found in more 
granular data.
Economic integration and the Single Market may 
have reinforced regional inequality in the EU: while it 
was beneficial for all regions, wealthier and advanced 
areas gained more. Such areas tend to lie close to the 
European geographic centre and thus benefit from larger 
market access than peripheral territories. Also, they tend 
to be more productive and innovative and thus benefit 
more from trade.17
Transport policy should also be critically examined. 
Increasing connectivity and accessibility among regions 
can foster networks and diffuse activities. Unintended 
negative effects, however, can also materialise. 
Facilitating transport between unequal places (e.g. a 
thriving metropolis and a nearby town) can reinforce 
agglomeration dynamics and draw (already scarce) 
resources towards the ‘centre’. The relatively less 
advanced area would thus lose services, activities and 
human capital rather than attract them. 
Similarly, EU research and innovation funding tends to 
be allocated to top research institutions, which are often 
located in advanced Western European cities. While 
financing research excellence is of utmost importance, 
if the gains resulting from it are not distributed to less 
advanced regions, inequalities will be exacerbated. 
Human capital is also subject to concentration. While 
freedom of movement has benefitted labour mobility, 
some less advanced areas are experiencing significant 
outflows of skilled individuals. In an increasingly 
knowledge-intensive economy, demand for skills 
will rise, thus perpetuating brain drain towards more 
advanced areas.
The Cohesion Policy is conceived to facilitate regional 
convergence while at the same time serve as the 
main EU investment tool. Reforms of Cohesion Policy 
intended to align it further to EU growth strategies (i.e. 
Lisbon and Europe 2020) to help maximise the EU’s 
overall welfare (i.e. GDP). Member states had to earmark 
large amounts of cohesion funding to actions aimed at 
competitiveness. While this may have been beneficial for 
growth at the aggregate level, as already argued, it does 
not necessarily reduce regional inequalities. 
In addition to evaluating past policies, the design 
process of the future EU industrial strategy should 
include an ex-ante assessment of policy provisions 
to estimate potentially negative distributional effects 
among regions.
A strategy for all
 
The EU industrial strategy must ensure that policy 
provisions in support of industrial excellence and 
frontier regions and sectors are matched by measures 
that actively target the average and underperforming 
ones. In practice, this means: 
q Supporting local industrial strategies that are 
tailor-made to specific challenges and capacities.18 
It is crucial to avoid one-size-fits-all policies that 
cannot be supported by local endowments (e.g. 
leapfrogging to high-tech, highly-innovative sectors 
in a region with a low skill-base and insufficient 
infrastructure). Rather, a more effective approach 
is one that fosters the absorption of obtainable 
innovation to revitalise existing) industrial activities 
and targets the productivity and capacity of SMEs.
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q Providing guidance to promote cooperation between 
regions to break the existing agglomeration 
‘bubbles’. Existing clusters and networks should 
welcome newcomers by bringing together businesses 
and actors from different EU regions. The ultimate 
aim is to support and strengthen intra-EU values 
chains. Tools in relation to smart specialisation and 
European Territorial Cooperation should be further 
exploited for these purposes. 
The ultimate aim is to support and 
strengthen intra-EU values chains.
q Facilitating the diffusion of the gains of agglomeration 
(e.g. knowledge, innovation, networks), since their 
dispersion is not happening as expected. This process 
can be supported through a specific instrument that 
accelerates technology and knowledge transfers 
within the EU to those regions and actors that are  
late adopters.19 
q Expanding the pool of participants in EU 
programmes by targeting and increasing capacity 
and awareness among less-advanced actors.
q Working in tandem with education and training 
policies. Regions with a low skill base have lower 
returns on research and development and innovation 
absorption. Coordination among education, 
innovation and development policies is crucial to 
avoid, on the one hand, a lack of skilled workforce 
for prospective innovative firms and, on the other, 
the emigration of educated workers who cannot find 
adequate employment. 
Misconceived policies are suboptimal and potentially 
harmful. To design future policies effectively, it is 
important to gain a deeper understanding of economic 
agglomeration dynamics and the effects of technological 
changes. More research into these issues and the 
characteristics of regions that risk being left behind  
is needed.
The transition to industry 4.0 could lead to increased 
geographic inequality, with gains only reaped in the most 
advanced regions. The new EU industrial strategy must 
avoid playing into the perpetuation of unequal dynamics 
by overly-focusing on frontier sectors and advanced 
players. To be a truly comprehensive strategy, it must 
equally account for those sectors and areas that struggle 
to keep up with the changes and bring them along.
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